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LAK:pwl
29 Nov. 54

1. PROBLEM. --

To place logistics planning in its proper perspective in relation to operation planning to assure maximum planning effectiveness and to ensure the most efficient logistical support of Agency operations.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM. --

- a. The Agency's operational effectiveness in the past has been impaired, if not completely negated in certain instances, because of inadequate consideration of logistical implications.
- b. Present Agency policy does not require operational plans to have complete and detailed logistic annexes.
- c. There is no integrated operational - logistical planning effort.
- d. The [REDACTED] DD/P and the Logistics Office of DD/A have agreed in principle that a closely coordinated planning relationship between these elements will promote greater operational effectiveness.
- e. The complexity of logistics problems necessitates highly technical logistic competence in their resolution.
- f. The DD/P and chiefs of area divisions consider themselves operational commanders, and as such, consider logistics as a proper element of their command.
- g. At present, Agency logistics plans are not in alignment with the

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- h. The need-to-know basis which surrounds operational planning has restricted the flow of essential data necessary for the Logistics Office to properly plan its activities.
- i. The Logistics Office is at present furnishing guidance, logistic planning data, and advice to operations.
- j. Regulations and procedures, currently in effect for determining logistical requirements, result in uneconomical operations.
- k. Top Secret Document No. 93979-A, dated 23 April 1954, delegates the authority and responsibilities of the DD/A for the planning and provisioning of logistical support of covert operations.

3. DISCUSSION. --

- a. Secret memorandum dated 15 July 1952, subject: "Organization of CIA Clandestine Services", provides in part for the establishment of a Chief of Administration responsible to the DD/P for ensuring adequate support of all clandestine operations. Existing authority as outlined in Agency Regulation [REDACTED] directs the STATINTL Chief of Logistics to furnish assistance in the preparation of logistic annexes when requested by operations (underscoring supplied).
- b. The capabilities of the Logistics Office have never been fully utilizedⁱⁿ/the development of logistic annexes to operational plans. The failure to develop these annexes concurrent with operations planning often results in inadequate support. A recent failure to plan logistical support is high-lighted in Project PBSUCCESS, as illustrated in Tab "A".

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- c. It is obvious from the study made of the flow of National Security Council doctrine as applicable to Agency clandestine operations, Tab "B", that logistics planning is not in evidence at the point when determination of feasibility of support is paramount.

Subsequent events in the process of operations planning generate logistical implications which, from the standpoint of budget and logistics capabilities, are unrealistic.

- d. In many instances, funds budgeted for support of operations are based on non-factual requirements compiled by operational elements not always in the best position to evaluate logistical capabilities.

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Had the Agency policy required realistic and coordinated planning instead of piecemeal fragmentary information from the operating elements, the requirements submitted by the Agency would have been firm and backed by sound logistical concepts and would have precluded the need for such measures.

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- e. The aforementioned memorandum of 15 July 1952 further states that the new organization structure recognizes only two command echelons: (1) the Director of Central Intelligence and (2) the Senior Representatives. Under this concept, it is logical to assume that there will be one logistics planning activity operation under the Director and one for each of the Senior Representatives. This directive further states that all orders to the Senior Representatives will be transmitted in the name of the Director; therefore, this places the DD/P and chiefs of area divisions as operational staff officers.
- f. Recognizing the sensitivity which surrounds operational planning, logistics need not be read into the actual operation beyond the point requiring logistics support. A sanitized brief of operations containing essentials is sufficient for the Logistics Office to perform its planning function.
- g. Lack of an integrated operational - logistical planning effort results in qualified logistical manpower not being used to the fullest extent, functions are duplicated, and the uneconomical procurement of materiel and services.
- h. Logistics planning and support may operate to limit, expand, or help set the course of operations to the extent that the maximum logistic support available will be the limiting, expanding, or directional factor. Unfortunately, the most desirable or best operational plan does not always govern; the governing factor may

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well be what is logistically possible or feasible. The goal of logistics and logistics support is that it will always operate as an automatic complement to operations and never as a curb.

The obvious necessity of establishing requirements and arranging logistics execution in support of an operation creates another link to operations.

- i. The adequacy of logistic plans and estimates ensures the logistical support and the degree of success or failure of all operations. Effective planning and execution of logistics support are inseparable from strategic planning. The success of an operation is entirely dependent upon the adequacy of logistical support, and performance will be proportional to the thoroughness and ingenuity of logistics planning. The logistics role cannot be subordinated to operations but must be given a position of commensurate stature.

4. CONCLUSIONS. --

- a. The overall efficiency of the Agency would be enhanced through the medium of clear-cut delegation of responsibility coupled with appropriate authority.
- b. Logistics planning, to be effective, must be performed concurrent with operational planning and to accomplish this, it is imperative that the Chief of Logistics participate in the formulation of Agency policy and plans.
- c. Agency global responsibilities dictate the need for sound logistical planning, sensitive to operations, to assure maximum results.

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- d. The responsibility placed on the DD/A, as contained in Top Secret Document No. 93979-A, dated 23 April 1954, requires implementation by regulatory issuance.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS. --

- a. That concurrence be given to the conclusions reached in this study.
- b. That proposed Regulation [REDACTED] (Tab "C"), implementing Top Secret Document No. 93979-A, as regards responsibility for advance planning and provision of support for covert operations, be approved.

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